Evacuate. Evacuate. Evacuate.

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21 February 2018

On 27 June 2016, the augmented flight crew of a Boeing 777-300ER (9V-SWB) being operated by Singapore Airlines on a flight from Singapore to Milan observed an indication of low oil quantity in the right engine after having reached their initial cruise altitude. After further abnormalities in respect of the performance of the right engine occurred, it was decided to set the right engine thrust to flight idle and return to Singapore at FL170. A subsequent landing on runway 20C after fuel dumping was followed by signs of substantial right engine distress and the outbreak of fire in and around the right engine and adjacent wing structure.

The initially substantial fire was brought under control within about 5 minutes and did not affect the fuselage so it was determined that an emergency evacuation was not necessary and passengers were subsequently disembarked from the aircraft via steps. The fire effectively destroyed the right engine and parts of the right wing and ignited pooled fuel which also damaged the runway surface.

The final report (http://bit.ly/2srLit6) questioned the crew’s decision not to evacuate, although the investigators also acknowledged that “making a decision to evacuate is not always straightforward”. The operator’s FCTM was found to recommend that “in a situation that a persistent smoke or a fire which cannot positively be confirmed to be completely extinguished, the safest course of action typically requires evacuation”. However, it also recommends that “pilots should utilise all available sources of information in making a decision regarding evacuation” and that “key factors to be considered include the urgency of the situation (e.g. possibility of significant injury or loss of life if a significant delay occurs)” and that “in case of doubt, an evacuation should be considered”.

The report also quotes that “in this occurrence, there were a number of resources that were not used by the flight crew but which could have been of help” which included turning on the taxi camera system, leaning out of the right side flight deck emergency escape window and actively seeking information from the cabin crew.

The flight crew depended on the fire commander as their sole information source when deciding whether an evacuation was needed. Several other resources which could have aided them in making their decision were not utilised.

In november 2017, Brussels Airport launched an awareness module that explains the principles of Local Standby and Full Emergency for Rescue and Fire Fighting (RFF) Services at EBBR. BeCA members received an e-news about this module, but in case you didn’t, have a look here: http://bit.ly/2HaJ9FA.