New IFALPA Papers

Briefing leaflet on remote pilots

A Remote Pilot is a person charged by the operator with duties essential to the operation of a remotely piloted aircraft and who manipulates the flight controls, as appropriate, during flight time.

This briefing leaflet addresses IFALPA’s initial thoughts on the growing industrial and representational demands of pilots in one of the fastest emerging and technologically advanced forms of aviation: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) and their impact in all areas of aviation are potentially enormous. Read more on http://bit.ly/2Nu6wza

Position on Downlink of pilot selected levels

Due to varying aircraft designs and airlines’ standard operating procedures, pilots may sometimes select intermediate levels/altitudes on SIDs and STARs, whilst they have been cleared for an even higher/lower level/altitude. Even though the crews understand the clearance and are adhering to it, their selection may trigger an alert at the controller working position. The controller then has to check the cleared level/altitude causing unnecessary frequency congestion. In the past, this has led to confusion, frustration, and even discussions on the frequency. This is a nuisance for other airspace users and a possible safety hazard during a critical phase of the flight. Read more on http://bit.ly/32p1WpT

Position on In-flight Flight Crew Rest Facilities

This position paper provides generic guidance for the design and specification of dedicated flight crew rest facilities provided for the exclusive use of flight crew on commercial transport aircraft operated with augmented flight crews. The main purpose of such facilities is to provide flight crew members with an adequate rest environment before the commencement of the next in-flight duty period. Read the full position paper: http://bit.ly/2NLoj3u

NAT Lateral ASEPS

On March 2019, longitudinal separation standards were reduced based on the availability of Space-Based ADS-B in the Shanwick (EGGX), Gander (CZQX), and Santa Maria (LPPO) Oceanic Control Areas in the North Atlantic (NAT), as part of the Advanced Surveillance Enhanced Procedural Separation (ASEPS) trials. The NAT region will be commencing the second phase of the ASEPS trials to include reduced lateral separation starting on or about 10 October 2019. If your aircraft is appropriately equipped and filed with Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance equipment, ATC may apply 19 NM lateral spacing between parallel or non-intersecting tracks, instead of the 23NM minimum lateral separation in use now. This is in addition to the reduced longitudinal separation implemented in the first phase. For more detailed information, please have a look at the full paper: http://bit.ly/32tPiWO

Briefing leaflet on Airspace classification

IFALPA has been informed that flight crews may sometimes not be aware of the classification of the airspace through which they are operating. This briefing leaflet is a refresher and reminder to be vigilant as to what separation and service is being provided at any given time. ICAO defines Airspaces into several categories: A, B, C, D, E, F, G. Within these airspaces different requirements exist in relation to what kind of flights are allowed within the airspace (IFR, IFR +VFR, VFR), separation between IFR/IFR IFR/VFR, VFR/VFR, mandatory usage of radio and transponder, maximum speed. Read more on http://bit.ly/2NQ2S1r

Position on Commercial Space Operations

The increased frequency of commercial space launches, the recovery of expended stages, and reusable launch vehicles and their associated debris fields have created the need for clearly defined safety standards. These activities and their associated restrictions have placed an undue burden on international airspace. Launch providers and airspace managers must control the unpredictability of flight efficiencies and the way airspace restrictions are organized. The development of guidance, Standards and Recommended Practices for these operations should engage the entire aviation community. Read more on http://bit.ly/33pYFIi.

Position on Reduced Runway Separation Minima for Night Operations

IFALPA is opposed to Reduced Runway Separation Minima being applied for Night Operations. The provisions to reduce runway separation have been agreed worldwide and should be used accordingly. The documented safety assessment for every runway that will be used is a major aspect in reducing separation but maintaining a high level of safety. With more and more utilization of stable approach criteria and thus the higher possibility of conducting a missed approach, the separation standards between two succeeding departing aircraft should also apply between a departing aircraft and an aircraft conducting a missed approach. Read more on http://bit.ly/32p23BP

Safety Bulletin on Winter Conditions at Northern Finland Airports

Safe winter operations normally require special procedures by airline maintenance, engineering, ground crew, and de-icing personnel. In Finland, FINAVIA and TRAFICOM publish an annual Safety Bulletin on winter conditions. This bulletin focuses on operations in northern Finland but the content is relevant to other locations subject to similar weather. It provides excellent guidance for both flight crews and operators. To read the paper, please go to: http://bit.ly/2K2Bigb

Safety Bulletin on GNSS Vulnerabilities

GNSS supports positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) applications. GNSS is the foundation of Performance Based Navigation (PBN), automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) and automatic dependent surveillance – contract (ADS-C). GNSS also provides a common time reference used to synchronize systems, avionics, communication networks and operations, and supports a wide range of non-aviation applications. With the increasing dependence on GNSS, it is important that GNSS vulnerabilities be properly addressed.

There are two types of GNSS Interference Sources: Intentional and Unintentional sources. The latter is not considered a significant threat, whilst the Intentional sources such as jamming and spoofing are considered serious threats to the continued safety of air transport.

Read the full safety bulletin and download the reporting form here: http://bit.ly/2K1xxrs.

If you detect a GNSS vulnerability, you should:

• Report the situation to ATC as soon as practicable and request special handling as required.
• File the GNSS Interference Reporting Form (page 3-4 of the safety bulletin), and
• Forward information to the IATA MENA sfomena@iata.org and ICAO MID Office icaomid@icao.int as soon as possible, including a description of the event (e.g. how the avionics failed/reacted during the anomaly).

Runway surface conditions: Global Reporting Format (GRF)

Runway surface conditions have contributed to many safety events and investigations have revealed shortfalls in the accuracy and timeliness of assessment and reporting methods currently provided for in ICAO provisions and guidance material. It is clear that the more we understand about performance the more we understand about safety.

The new ICAO methodology for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions, commonly known as the Global Reporting Format (GRF), enables the harmonized assessment and reporting of runway surface conditions and a correspondingly improved flight crew assessment of take-off and landing performance.

Applicable as of 5 November 2020, ICAO will make coordinated and globally applicable changes to several annexes:

• Annex 3 ‘Meteorological services’, 
• Annex 6 ‘Aircraft operations’ Part II Aeroplane Performance Manual (Doc 10064) – NEW
• Annex 8 ‘Airworthiness’,
• Annex 11 ‘PANS ATM’ (Doc 4444),
• Annex 14, Vol I ‘PANS Aerodromes’ (Doc 9981) and Circular 355 – NEW,
• Annex 15 ‘Aeronautical Information’

BeCA is involved in this project via the meetings organised at Brussels Airport where we meet with BCAA, airport, ATC and airlines at the Local Runway Safety Team (LRST). For more information on the GRF, please visit ICAO’s dedicated website at: http://bit.ly/2NUbpQS.